feat: bounty board, task lifecycle, AI work performer flow, notifications (phase 8)

- whitelist HTML sanitizer (stdlib tokenizer) with XSS vector tests
- developer board: pool-scoped visibility, customer/search/minBounty/sort
  filters, stale-task age badges, competing-claims visibility setting,
  saved filters in profile extras
- claims: request/withdraw (developer), approve/decline (consultant) with
  notifications to winners and losers; unassign/abandon back to board
- work tracking: start, sanitized comments with @mention notifications,
  time logging, submit for review
- review queue + review with per-AC checklist stored on the timeline;
  approve writes the immutable bountyAwards row (human assignees only)
- assign-to-AI: §5.2 job submission, HMAC-verified callback endpoint,
  idempotent by jobId, artifacts downloaded into GridFS, failure path
  keeps the task assigned with timeline + notification
- notifications API + bell with unread badge, dropdown, page, WS toasts
- pages: bounty board, my-tasks kanban, task detail (role-driven actions,
  review dialog, AI dialog), review queue, developer pool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
etalon
2026-06-12 20:11:05 +02:00
parent f87b954f27
commit 70a813edfa
28 changed files with 2764 additions and 14 deletions
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// Package chat implements messaging primitives. sanitize.go is the
// server-side rich-text whitelist sanitizer (§2.2): allowed tags are
// b i u s a code pre ul ol li br p blockquote; only <a> keeps an attribute
// (href, http/https/mailto only). Everything else is escaped as text.
// Implemented with a small hand-written tokenizer — no parser dependency.
package chat
import (
"html"
"strings"
)
var allowedTags = map[string]bool{
"b": true, "i": true, "u": true, "s": true, "a": true, "code": true,
"pre": true, "ul": true, "ol": true, "li": true, "br": true, "p": true,
"blockquote": true,
}
var voidTags = map[string]bool{"br": true}
// SanitizeHTML rewrites untrusted rich text into safe HTML. Unknown tags are
// dropped (their text content kept), attributes are stripped (except a safe
// href on <a>), tags are re-balanced so output never leaks open elements.
func SanitizeHTML(in string) string {
var out strings.Builder
var stack []string
i := 0
for i < len(in) {
c := in[i]
if c != '<' {
j := strings.IndexByte(in[i:], '<')
if j < 0 {
out.WriteString(html.EscapeString(in[i:]))
break
}
out.WriteString(html.EscapeString(in[i : i+j]))
i += j
continue
}
// find the end of the tag
end := strings.IndexByte(in[i:], '>')
if end < 0 {
out.WriteString(html.EscapeString(in[i:]))
break
}
raw := in[i+1 : i+end] // between < and >
i += end + 1
closing := strings.HasPrefix(raw, "/")
raw = strings.TrimPrefix(raw, "/")
raw = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(raw), "/")
name, attrs := splitTag(raw)
name = strings.ToLower(name)
if !allowedTags[name] {
continue // drop the tag entirely, keep surrounding text
}
if closing {
// close up to the matching open tag, if any
for n := len(stack) - 1; n >= 0; n-- {
if stack[n] == name {
for len(stack) > n {
top := stack[len(stack)-1]
stack = stack[:len(stack)-1]
out.WriteString("</" + top + ">")
}
break
}
}
continue
}
if voidTags[name] {
out.WriteString("<" + name + ">")
continue
}
if name == "a" {
href := safeHref(attrs)
if href == "" {
out.WriteString("<a>")
} else {
out.WriteString(`<a href="` + html.EscapeString(href) + `" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">`)
}
} else {
out.WriteString("<" + name + ">")
}
stack = append(stack, name)
}
// balance anything left open
for n := len(stack) - 1; n >= 0; n-- {
out.WriteString("</" + stack[n] + ">")
}
return out.String()
}
// splitTag separates the tag name from its raw attribute string.
func splitTag(raw string) (string, string) {
for i := 0; i < len(raw); i++ {
switch raw[i] {
case ' ', '\t', '\n', '\r':
return raw[:i], raw[i+1:]
}
}
return raw, ""
}
// safeHref extracts href and accepts only http, https, or mailto schemes.
func safeHref(attrs string) string {
lower := strings.ToLower(attrs)
idx := strings.Index(lower, "href")
if idx < 0 {
return ""
}
rest := strings.TrimSpace(attrs[idx+4:])
if !strings.HasPrefix(rest, "=") {
return ""
}
rest = strings.TrimSpace(rest[1:])
var val string
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(rest, `"`):
if end := strings.IndexByte(rest[1:], '"'); end >= 0 {
val = rest[1 : 1+end]
}
case strings.HasPrefix(rest, "'"):
if end := strings.IndexByte(rest[1:], '\''); end >= 0 {
val = rest[1 : 1+end]
}
default:
val = rest
if sp := strings.IndexAny(val, " \t\n"); sp >= 0 {
val = val[:sp]
}
}
val = strings.TrimSpace(val)
low := strings.ToLower(val)
if strings.HasPrefix(low, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(low, "https://") ||
strings.HasPrefix(low, "mailto:") {
return val
}
return ""
}
// SanitizePlain strips ALL tags, returning escaped plain text (used where
// rich text is not allowed).
func SanitizePlain(in string) string {
var out strings.Builder
i := 0
for i < len(in) {
if in[i] != '<' {
j := strings.IndexByte(in[i:], '<')
if j < 0 {
out.WriteString(html.EscapeString(in[i:]))
break
}
out.WriteString(html.EscapeString(in[i : i+j]))
i += j
continue
}
end := strings.IndexByte(in[i:], '>')
if end < 0 {
out.WriteString(html.EscapeString(in[i:]))
break
}
i += end + 1
}
return out.String()
}
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package chat
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestSanitizeHTML(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
in string
want string
}{
{"plain text escaped", `hello <world> & "friends"`, "hello &amp; &#34;friends&#34;"},
{"allowed formatting kept", "<b>bold</b> <i>it</i> <u>u</u> <s>s</s>", "<b>bold</b> <i>it</i> <u>u</u> <s>s</s>"},
{"paragraph and lists", "<p>a</p><ul><li>x</li><li>y</li></ul>", "<p>a</p><ul><li>x</li><li>y</li></ul>"},
{"code and pre", "<pre><code>x := 1</code></pre>", "<pre><code>x := 1</code></pre>"},
{"blockquote", "<blockquote>q</blockquote>", "<blockquote>q</blockquote>"},
{"br void", "a<br>b<br/>c", "a<br>b<br>c"},
{"script stripped", `<script>alert(1)</script>hi`, "alert(1)hi"},
{"img dropped", `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>safe`, "safe"},
{"event handlers stripped from allowed tag", `<b onclick="evil()">x</b>`, "<b>x</b>"},
{"style attr stripped", `<p style="position:fixed">x</p>`, "<p>x</p>"},
{"https link kept with rel", `<a href="https://x.y/z">l</a>`,
`<a href="https://x.y/z" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">l</a>`},
{"http link kept", `<a href="http://x.y">l</a>`,
`<a href="http://x.y" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">l</a>`},
{"javascript href removed", `<a href="javascript:alert(1)">l</a>`, "<a>l</a>"},
{"data href removed", `<a href="data:text/html,x">l</a>`, "<a>l</a>"},
{"single-quoted js href removed", `<a href='javascript:x'>l</a>`, "<a>l</a>"},
{"unquoted href", `<a href=https://ok.example>l</a>`,
`<a href="https://ok.example" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">l</a>`},
{"unclosed tags balanced", "<b>bold <i>both", "<b>bold <i>both</i></b>"},
{"stray close ignored", "</b>text", "text"},
{"mismatched nesting closed in order", "<b><i>x</b></i>", "<b><i>x</i></b>"},
{"case insensitive tags", "<B>x</B><SCRIPT>y</SCRIPT>", "<b>x</b>y"},
{"nested quotes attack", `<a href="https://x" "><script>alert(1)</script>">x</a>`,
`<a href="https://x" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">alert(1)&#34;&gt;x</a>`},
{"incomplete tag escaped", "a <b", "a &lt;b"},
{"empty input", "", ""},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := SanitizeHTML(tt.in); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("SanitizeHTML(%q)\n got %q\n want %q", tt.in, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSanitizeHTMLNeverEmitsDangerousOutput(t *testing.T) {
vectors := []string{
`<script>alert(1)</script>`,
`<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`,
`<svg onload=alert(1)>`,
`<iframe src="https://evil"></iframe>`,
`<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>`,
`<A HREF="JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)">x</A>`,
`<b onmouseover="alert(1)">x</b>`,
`<<script>script>alert(1)<</script>/script>`,
`<p><style>*{}</style></p>`,
`<form action="https://evil"><input></form>`,
}
for _, v := range vectors {
got := strings.ToLower(SanitizeHTML(v))
for _, bad := range []string{"<script", "onerror", "onload", "onmouseover",
"javascript:", "<iframe", "<svg", "<img", "<form", "<style", "<input"} {
if strings.Contains(got, bad) {
t.Errorf("vector %q produced dangerous output %q (contains %q)", v, got, bad)
}
}
}
}
func TestSanitizePlain(t *testing.T) {
if got := SanitizePlain(`<b>x</b> & <script>y</script>`); got != "x &amp; y" {
t.Errorf("SanitizePlain = %q", got)
}
}